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     Abstract 
2IDOOWKHWKLQJVZHFRXOGVD\ZKDWGHWHUPLQHVZKDWLVZRUWKVD\LQJ"*UHHQILHOG¶V
principle of informativeness states that, right from the onset of language, humans 
selectively comment on whatever they find unexpected. We quantify this tendency 
using information theoretic measures, and test the counterintuitive prediction that 
children will produce words that are low frequency given the context because these 
will be most informative.  Using corpora of child directed speech, we identified 
adjectives that varied in how informative (i.e., unexpected) they were given the noun 
they modified. Three-year-olds (N=31, replication N=13) heard an experimenter use 
these adjectives to describe pictures. The cKLOGUHQ¶V task was then to describe the 
pictures to DQRWKHUSHUVRQ$VWKHLQIRUPDWLRQFRQWHQWRIWKHH[SHULPHQWHU¶VDGMHFWLYH
LQFUHDVHGVRGLGFKLOGUHQ¶VWHQGHQF\WR comment on the feature that adjective had 
encoded. Furthermore, our analyses suggest that children balance this informativeness 
with a competing drive to ease production. 
 
 Keywords:  Information theory, pragmatics, child language, language 
production.   
 
  
ǯ
ǫ 3 
 
What's worth talking about? Information theory reveals how children balance 
informativeness and ease of production  
 How do we decide what to talk about? It is generally accepted that when we 
speak, we try to be informative (Grice, 1975) but pinning down how we achieve this 
has proved a challenge. What empirical work there is tends to test cases where 
information is needed for disambiguation (e.g., a speaker comments on a feature of an 
object in order to identify which of two alternatives is intended).  Yet, in everyday 
conversation, our goals are not always so constrained.  Often we have free range of 
what to comment on, if anything. Of all the things we could say in a given moment, 
then, what determines what is worth saying? 
*UHHQILHOG¶VSrinciple of informativeness (Greenfield, 1979; Greenfield & 
Smith, 1976), proposes that, right from the onset of language, infants choose to 
comment on things they find unexpected or uncertain and leave unmentioned 
whatever is constant or can be assumed. Greenfield suggested that this behaviour 
might be captured by the concept of information provided by the mathematical theory 
of communication (Shannon, 1948). In this case, a message provides information to 
the extent that it is unpredictable given what is already known. However, this early 
sketch of how to quantify informativeness was abandoned following a critique by Pea 
(1979). In this study, we demonstrate that an information theoretic approach is viable. 
Moreover, adopting it brings to light a trade-off between informativeness (which 
requires using unlikely forms) and ease of production (which favours using likely ± 
i.e., frequent - forms).  We show that, even from 3 years of age, while children find it 
easier to produce frequent forms, they nonetheless make the effort to talk about the 
unexpected.  
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*UHHQILHOG¶V3ULQFLSOHRIInformativeness 
 Greenfield & Smith (1976) analysed naturalistic recordings of children at the 
one-word stage and observed cases where a child had the choice of saying one of two 
words to talk about an event (e.g., the words skate and on to talk about putting skates 
on). They explained why one or other word was said at any given moment using the 
concept of uncertainty. For example, LIWKHREMHFWZDVRXWRIWKHFKLOG¶VSRVVHVVLRQ
then it became uncertain and the word referring to it (skate) was likely to be produced. 
If the child had the object, it became certain and they would express something else, 
such as a desired change of state (on).  On the basis of these observations, Greenfield 
and Smith DUJXHGIRUµFHUWDLQW\-uncertainty as the perceptual-cognitive basis for the 
GLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQSUHVXSSRVLWLRQDQGDVVHUWLRQLQODQJXDJH¶SS 
 To test this claim experimentally, Greenfield and Zukow (1978) had parents 
perform sets of actions and describe them as they did so.  For example, a parent might 
hand their FKLOG0RPP\¶VVKRHWKHQ &DWK\¶VsKRHWKHQ$OLFH¶VVKRH such that the 
object was constant but the possessor varied. For each case like this, the authors 
derived rules HJµwhen the object is given but the possessor changes, comment on 
the possessor¶) and children followed these at above-chance rates. Other studies using 
this contrastive method found similar results with children able to produce multi-word 
speech (e.g., Baker & Greenfield, 1988; Greenfield & Dent, 1982; O'Neill & Happé, 
2000; Salomo, Lieven, & Tomasello, 2009).  
 Greenfield & Smith (1976) originally proposed that these findings could all be 
explained by appeal to information theory, which connects uncertainty and 
communication via probability theory (Shannon, 1948). However, this approach, 
where a message provides information to the extent that it is unpredictable, did not 
bear fruit at the time as it was subject to harsh critique.  
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3HD¶VCritique 
Pea (1979) objected to using information theory to explain word choice for 
two main reasons. First, he questioned whether equating unexpectedness (low 
probability) with informativeness would mean that we should talk in nonsensical 
utterances all the time. Were unexpected speech per se our goal, this would be the 
case. However, *UHHQILHOG¶VFODLPZDVWKDWZHDLPWRFRPPHQWRQWKHXQH[SHFWHG
rather than simply make unexpected comments (Greenfield, 1980). Moreover, this 
drive to be informative can only ever be one of a number of pressures on speech 
production, including the need to be conventional (Clark, 2007), to reduce effort 
(Zipf, 1949) and, critically, to ground what is being said in a topic of conversation (E. 
Bates, 1976).    
 3HD¶VVHFRQGFRQFHUQZDVthat the informativeness observed by Greenfield 
was context-specific while, in its standard formulation, information theory is 
concerned with the probability of events independent of the situation in which they 
occur (e.g., the probability of a symbol being sent over a communication channel 
without reference to the on-going discourse). In *UHHQILHOG¶Vstudies, the likelihood of 
a word being used is defined with respect to specific situations (e.g., saying shoe in 
the above scenario becomes less likely as the contrast set is established). It is well 
recognised that such contrastive language forms a special case - often marked with 
distinctive prosody (Chafe, 1974 pp. 117-118). Nonetheless, we argue that the 
principle of informativeness should extend to language production in general and that 
it should be quantifiable. Context-specificity should not be a barrier to quantification 
for two reasons. 
 First, the probabilities used in information theory need not be context free - 
one can assign conditional likelihoods to events in context. Recent studies suggest 
ǯ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children make use of such situation-specific conditional probabilities in language 
comprehension and information seeking (Frank & Goodman, 2014; Nelson, Divjak, 
Gudmundsdottir, Martignon, & Meder, 2014) and it is plausible that such probabilities 
would affect language production too.  
 Second there are many communicative situations in which, while the 
informativeness of an utterance might in principle depend on a particular context, it 
can nonetheless be reliably estimated without direct reference to it. For example, if 
one turns on the radio without any expectations about what will be on, then the 
probability of hearing any particular word could be well estimated by looking at the 
relative frequency of all English words across all contexts in corpora of transcribed 
speech (see Jurafsky, 2003 for evidence that people are sensitive to such language 
statistics and, by extension, the real world events that generate them). By looking at 
corpora of child directed speech, we can obtain such estimates of children¶V
expectations.  
 In the current study, we took adjective+noun combinations as a test case, and 
quantified how informative children should find different adjectives given the nouns 
they modified.  We estimated the frequency of each adjective+noun phrase and of the 
noun alone using a corpus of child-directed speech, then calculated the information 
content of the adjective as follows: 
IC = - log2 f(ADJECTIVE + NOUN)/f(NOUN)           (1) 
 The question of interest was whether children would find relatively more 
informative adjectives more worthy of mention. The way we approached this 
experimentally was to have children hear an adult describe pictures using adjective-
noun combinations of varying information content (e.g., µpretty dress¶). We then 
invited children to describe the pictures to another person. The pictures depicted a 
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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single object such that any adjectives served a descriptive function rather than a 
contrastive one (Karmiloff-Smith, 1979) and were thus optional. That is, producing a 
noun alone would have been perfectly felicitous. The question was whether hearing 
an DGXOW¶V informative adjective would make children attend to the feature it encoded 
and later deem it more worthy of comment.  
Information content and ease of production 
 On the above definition of information content, children should want to say 
infrequent things. This is counterintuitive given that, generally speaking, the more 
frequent a word or phrase is, the easier children find it to say (Ambridge, Kidd, 
Rowland, & Theakston, 2015). Thus, if speakers try to minimise the effort of 
producing utterances, they should say frequent (i.e., uninformative) things. This 
tension was captured theoretically by Zipf (1949) in his Principle of Human Least 
Effort. Zipf proposed that human languages are subject to contradictory forces of 
speaker economy ± the need to minimise the effort of production - and auditor 
economy ± the need to make the message useful to the listener. In testing FKLOGUHQ¶V
tendency to be informative, then, we also assessed the impact of the known tendency 
to produce easier forms.   
 We predicted that, where the experimenter produced a highly informative 
adjective (i.e., where the adjective was infrequent given the noun), children would be 
more likely to themselves produce an adjective. If the child did so, we also considered 
whether they used the same one as the experimenter or another form HJµmuddy 
VKRHV¶ instead of  µGLUW\VKRHV¶).  Using the same adjective should be easier if it is 
frequent given the noun (Bannard & Matthews, 2008) and this should act as a counter 
pressure in production.  
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
ǫ 8 
 Finally, since FKLOGUHQ¶Vdescriptions can be affected by their DGGUHVVHH¶V
knowledge state from around three years of age (Menig-Peterson, 1975; Perner & 
Leekham, 1986; Saylor, Baird, & Gallerani, 2006), we explored whether this might 
aIIHFWFKLOGUHQ¶VSURGXFWLRQ7hus, in Experiment 1, half the children talked to an 
addressee who could see the pictures, and half to an addressee who could not. Since 
this distinction did not DIIHFWFKLOGUHQ¶VSHUIRUPDQFHWKLVYDULDEOHZDVUHPRYHGLQ
replication Experiment 2.  
Experiment 1 
Method  
  This experiment and the following replication were approved by the 
Institutional Review Board of the University of Texas at Austin and were carried out 
in accordance with the provisions of the World Medical Association Declaration of 
Helsinki. 
 Participants. Thirty-one typically developing, English-speaking 3-year-olds 
(mean age: 41 months; Range: 36-47 months) were included. Their families were 
residents of Austin, Texas, primarily middle-class and European-American. Nine 
additional children were tested but excluded (1 due to experimenter error, 8 due to 
producing codable responses on fewer than 50% of trials).  A sample size of 32 was 
determined in advance according to 1) the number of participants available within an 
academic year and 2) the aim of testing in multiples of 4 for counterbalancing.  
 Materials. Eight English nouns were paired with two English adjectives each 
WRIRUPSKUDVHVIRXQGLQDOOPRWKHUV¶DQGRUIDWKHUV¶VSHHFKLQWKH(QJOLVKODQJXDJH
transcripts in the CHILDES database (MacWhinney, 2000). Frequencies were taken 
from the combined set of all transcripts. Phrases were chosen with the objective of a) 
spanning a range of noun, adjective and phrase frequencies, and b) minimizing any 
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ǯ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correlation between the three frequency types. This was important in order to be able 
decouple any effect of word frequency from that of conditional probability and by 
extension conditional information content. The phrases used are listed in table 1. 
There was no significant correlation between any of the three frequencies. Nor was 
there any correlation between adjective information content and log adjective 
frequency (r(14) = -0.06,  p = .819), adjective length in syllables (r(14) = .28, p = 
.287) or with syllable frequency based on syllabification from CELEX (Baayen, 
Piepenbrock, & Gulikers, 1995) and frequencies from the CHILDES corpus described 
above (log frequency of first syllable: r(14) = .06, p =  .833; log mean syllable 
frequency: r(14) = .25, p = .344). The stimuli were split into two sets so that each 
child encountered each noun only once. For each phrase, a different picture was 
created to visually represent it (see supplementary materials).   
 Stimuli were checked after data collection for the H[SHULPHQWHU¶VSURVRG\Wo 
check if it differed as a function of adjective information content. Following the 
procedure reported by Kaland, Krahmer & Swerts (2014), we extracted the maximum 
F0 (Hz) from all adjectives and nouns for all participants using the autocorrelation 
method implemented in Praat (Boersma & Weenink, 2016) and converted these to 
Equivalent Rectangular Bandwidth (ERB) values. We subtracted the pitch value 
(ERB) of the noun from the pitch value of the adjective (ERB). We then built a multi-
level logistic regression model predicting this relative measure, with adjective 
information content included as a fixed effect, and considering all possible random 
effects structures. Including adjective information content did not give a significant 
improvement over a null model, regardless of the random effects structure employed.   
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Table 1. 
Stimuli and associated statistics for Experiment 1 (corpus contains 9.1M words) 
Phrase 
 
 
Set 
 
 
Adjective 
information 
content (bits) 
Phrase 
frequency 
 
Adjective 
frequency 
 
Noun 
frequency 
 
Frequency of 
first (and second) 
syllable 
stinky baby 1 11.99 3 191 12234 1090 (11472) 
silly baby 2 9.49 17 4242 12234 15096 (87552) 
pretty dress 1 4.57 61 4144 1446 7290 (26044) 
little dress 2 7.18 10 27845 1446 87552 (35656) 
straight line 1 4.06 52 964 868 970 
long line 2 5.24 23 3996 868 5462 
young man 1 5.86 86 379 5000 459 
mean man 2 11.29 2 5538 5000 5595 
funny pajamas 1 9.64 1 4519 797 4962 (38395) 
cuddly pajamas 2 8.05 3 66 797 66 (87552) 
tiny road 1 8.66 3 1040 1217 6913 (38395) 
bumpy road 2 5.29 31 169 1217 536 (8898) 
huge tower 1 10.16 1 276 1147 277  
tall tower 2 4.58 48 773 1147 774 
kind woman 1 8.32 1 3583 320 3603 
old woman 2 3.46 29 2739 320 2797 
 
 Procedure. Upon arrival, each child played with two experimenters. Once 
they were at ease, the child was asked to sit down at a small table in the centre of the 
room, with E1 sitting down across from them.  E2 announced that she had work to do 
and that she would have to come back later and left the room. E1 then pulled out some 
cards and informed the child that, for this game, she had some pictures for them to 
ORRNDWDQGWKDWWKH\ZRXOG³VD\ZKDWZHVHH´)ROORZLQJWKLV(ZRXOGJRWKURXJK
one of the sets of eight images (either set 1 or set 2, counterbalanced), holding each 
image up in turn and labelling it with the associated adjective-noun phrase.  If the 
child attempted to repeat the phrases at this point or to talk over E1, they would be 
DVNHGWR³ORRNDQGOLVWHQ´XQWLO(¶VWXUQZDVRYHU:KHQWKLVZDVILQLVKHG(
would re-enter the room, at which point E1 would invite E2 to join the game and then 
SURPSWWKHFKLOGWR³WHOO(DERXWWKHSLFWXUHV´7KLVRFFXUUHGXQGHURQHRIWZR
ǯ
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conditions (16 participants in the first condition, 15 in the second, randomly 
assigned): 
 Picture-visible-to-addressee condition. E2 would respond to the invitation to 
join in by taking a seat at the table next to the child, from which they could clearly see 
each image along with the child.  
 Picture-hidden-from-addressee condition. E2 would respond to the invitation 
to join in by walking over to a laptop previously hidden under a blanket behind E1, 
VXJJHVWLQJWKDWVKHFRXOGXVHLWWRZULWHGRZQWKHFKLOG¶VGHVFULSWLRQVRIHDFKLPDJH
She would then state that the laptop seemed to be too heavy to move and that she 
would have to sit down where she was²a location from which she was clearly unable 
to see the images herself.  
 In both conditions E1 would then hold up each picture in turn for the child to 
label. If the child did not offer a response for any given picture, E1 would prompt 
WKHPDJDLQWR³WHOO(ZKDW\RXVHHLQWKHSLFWXUH´.  If after an interval of time the 
child was still unable to respond, E1 would move on to the next picture. 
The order in which the pictures were presented was identical for the 
H[SHULPHQWHU¶VDQGWKHFKLOGUHQ¶VSURGXFWLRQ7KHRUGHURISUHVHQWDWLRQZDV
randomized for each child. Due to experimenter error, two children heard the same 
order. 
 Transcription and Coding. The recordings were coded by the second author. 
Each utterance was coded for a) whether the child had produced an adjective, and b) 
whether that adjective was identical to the adjective used by E1.  Rare cases where 
children produced alternative or erroneous grammatical forms of modification (e.g., 
VD\LQJµEXPSVURDG¶LQVWHDGRIµbumpy road¶) were included since the question of 
interest was whether the feature that WKHH[SHULPHQWHU¶VDGMHFWLYHHQFRGHGZDV
ǯ
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commented on (not grammatical form). Data from 30 participants was reliability 
coded by a research assistant who was blind to the purpose of the study and agreed 
with the first coder on 94% of responses for the first coding decision (i.e., whether an 
adjective was produced, ț = 0.852) and 93% of responses for the second coding 
decision (i.e., whether it was the same adjective as the experimenter, ț = 0.803). 
Results 
 Of the 222 responses children made in total, 21% of these contained no 
adjective, 60% contained the same adjective as the experimenter had used, and 19% 
contained a different adjective. For each of the 42 responses in which a different 
adjective was used, all but 6 responses unambiguously referred to the same semantic 
feature. Given the low number referring to a different feature, this distinction was not 
included in the following models (i.e., all cases were collapsed together into the 
FDWHJRU\µGLIIHUHQWDGMHFWLYH¶ 
We analysed the data using a sequential logistic procedure (also known as a 
nested dichotomies model, Fox, 1997; Tutz, 1991).  We fitted binary logit models to 1) 
whether or not the child used an adjective, and then 2) whether or not the adjective (if 
produced) was the same as the H[SHULPHQWHU¶VVHHILJXUH for the structure of this 
procedure). Information content was centered so that its lowest value became zero in 
order to allow meaningful interpretation of intercepts, but no scaling was performed so 
as to retain generalizability to other items. As each child participated in multiple trials, 
and to take account of additional differences between items, we used a multilevel 
version. Participant, noun and adjective were considered for inclusion as random effects 
on all appropriate model terms but excluded if they did not improve fit, using the 
iterative procedure of Bates, Kliegl, Vasishth & Baayen (2015). Based on this selection 
procedure, a random effect of participant on the intercept for decision one (did the child 
ǯ
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produce an adjective) and a random effect of noun on the slope for decision 2 (did the 
child use the same adjective) were included. The fit of the model was not improved by 
including visual access condition (whether E2 could see the pictures or not; 
Ȥ2(1)=0.076, p = 0.782), or an interaction between visual access condition and 
information content (Ȥ2 (2)=0.75, p = 0.686) and thus these terms were not included in 
reported models.  
 
Figure 1: Sequential logistic model with two stages. 
 
The final models were fitted with Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo 
methods using the JAGS software (Plummer, 2003).  Along with estimates, 90% 
credible intervals, standard deviations and one-tailed p-values, order-restricted Bayes 
factors are reported for the parameters of interest (the effect of adjective 
informativeness on both decisions). These tell us the ratio of the likelihood of the 
hypothesis (that the true value of the slope parameter differs from zero) and the null 
hypothesis (in all cases here that the true value of the slope parameter is zero) given the 
data. We calculated these using the Savage-Dickey method (Wagenmakers, 
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ǯ
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Lodewyckx, Kuriyal, & Grasman, 2010). This requires setting an informative range for 
the prior on a parameter of interest, while allowing diffuse priors for all other terms. We 
assume that for any single decision, the movement in odds as a function of 
informativeness will most likely fall below 99 which is equivalent to a change between 
from 1% of participants and half the participants (or half the participants and 99% of 
participants) producing the adjective, and thus use a normal distribution with a mean of 
zero and a standard deviation of (log 99) 4.6, scaled to the range of the information 
content predictor.  
 The inferred parameters for the sequential logistic model are shown in table 2. 
The effects are visualized in figure 2. The lines represent the fitted models with 
intercepts adjusted to the participant harmonic mean where relevant random terms 
were included. Figure 2a plots the proportion of children who produced an adjective 
as a function of information. For those cases in which an adjective was produced, 
ILJXUHEVKRZVZKHWKHURUQRWLWZDVWKHVDPHDGMHFWLYHDVWKHH[SHULPHQWHU¶V The 
likelihood of a child producing an adjective increases by 22% for each additional bit 
of informatLRQJLYHQE\WKHH[SHULPHQWHU¶VDGMHFWLYH. That is, as the information 
FRQWHQWRIWKHH[SHULPHQWHU¶VDGMHFWLYHLQFUHDVHGVRGLGWKHWHQGHQF\IRUWKHFKLOGUHQ
to produce an adjective.  The likelihood of a child who produces an adjective 
producing the same adjective as the experimenter, in contrast, decreases by 31% for 
each bit of information it provides. That is, as the information content of the 
H[SHULPHQWHU¶VDGMHFWLYHLQFUHDVHGLHWKHIUHTXHQFy of the adjective-noun 
combination decreased) children were less likely to use the same adjective as the 
experimenter and more likely to use a different adjective that meant the same thing. 
The Bayes factors tell us that, according to the standard interpretative scale of Kass 
and Rafferty (1995), there is ³positive´ evidence in favour of both of these effects.  
ǯ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Table 2.  
Summary of fixed effects for a) the proportion of participants who produced an adjective 
(adjective coded as 1, no adjective coded as 0); b) the proportion of the participants who 
produced the same adjective as the experimenter (for cases in which an adjective was 
produced; same adjective coded as 1, different adjective coded as 0). 
 
 Did the child use an adjective? Was it the same adjective as E1? 
 
 
ȕ 
 
SD P Bayes 
Factor 
ȕ 
 
SD p Bayes 
Factor 
Intercept 1.79 
(0.67 -
3.10) 
0.75 .003  2.35 
(1.64 -
3.12) 
0.45 <.001  
Information 
content 
0.20  
(0.05 -
0.36) 
0.09 .013 3.64 -0.28     
(-0.54 -   
-0.04) 
0.16 .038 3.19 
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a) 
 
b) 
 
Figure 2. The relation (in Experiment 1) between adjective informativeness and a) the 
proportion of participants who produced an adjective; b) the proportion of the 
participants who produced the same adjective as the experimenter (for cases in which 
an adjective was produced).  
ǯ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 The statistics (p-value, Bayes Factor) in table 2 concern whether the slopes for 
each decision differ from zero i.e., whether 1) the adjective information content slope 
for the decision to produce an adjective is significantly above zero and 2) whether the 
adjective information content slope for the decision to produce the same adjective as 
the experimenter is significantly below zero. It is also possible to ask whether the 
slopes differ from each other ± i.e., whether the effect of adjective information content 
is different for the two decisions. While it follows from the above analysis that this is 
the case, for completeness ± and to directly quantify the weight of evidence for the 
hypothesis that informativeness is in tension with ease of production - we built a 
model including a shared slope term and a same-adjective decision specific term (with 
doubled standard deviation on the prior to allow the slopes to vary in direction) and 
tested whether the value of this second term differed from zero. We observe a positive 
shared slope (mean estimate = .20, SD =.09, p = .016) with a negative same-adjective 
decision specific term (mean estimate = -.49, SD = .19, p = .008, Bayes Factor  = 
9.78). This indicates positive evidence that adjective information content has a 
different relationship to deciding whether to produce an adjective than it does to 
deciding whether to produce the same adjective as the experimenter.  
Discussion  
 Experiment 1 suggests that information theory can explain what children 
choose to sa\$VWKHLQIRUPDWLRQFRQWHQWRIWKHH[SHULPHQWHU¶VDGMHFWLYHLQFUHDVHG
so did the tendency for the children to comment on the feature it encoded.  However, 
the likelihood that they would use the exact same adjective to do so decreased, 
suggesting a counter-pressure from ease of production. In Experiment 2, we tested the 
robustness of the primary finding via replication with more items, new participants 
and an improved method (stimulus descriptions played on a computer).  
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Experiment 2: Replication 
Method  
 Participants. A bootstrap power analysis (Efron & Tibshirani, 1993) using the 
data and model from Experiment 1 suggested that the primary effect of 
informativeness (i.e., its impact on whether or not to produce an adjective) seen in 
Experiment 1 should be apparent with 13 participants. In this replication thirteen 
typically-developing, English-speaking 3-year-olds (mean age: 39 months; Range: 36- 
44 months) were included. Their families were residents of Austin, Texas, primarily 
middle-class and European-American. 
 Materials. There were 20 items (two adjectives paired with each of 10 nouns, 
with each child encountering each noun only once). These items were an expanded set 
of the phrases from Experiment 1. Two item pairs from the original study were 
excluded because they were either distracting (stinky baby) or potentially gender 
biased in experience (pretty/little dress). Items are presented in table 3.  There was no 
significant correlation between any of the noun, adjective and phrase frequencies. Nor 
was there any correlation between adjective information content and log adjective 
frequency (r(18) = .07,  p = .768), adjective length in syllables (r(18) = .32, p = .168) 
or with syllable frequency (log frequency of first syllable: r(18) = .21, p =  .384;  log 
mean syllable frequency: r(18) = .23, p = .329).  
 To control delivery of the items, a research assistant pre-recorded all adjective 
noun combinations so they could be played over a computer. The prosodic properties 
of the recorded stimuli were checked following the procedure for study 1. A multi-
level logistic regression model predicting the difference between the maximum F0s of 
the noun and adjective was built. Including adjective information content (with 
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random effects of noun on the intercept) did not give a significant improvement over a 
null model (NB no random slopes were considered for model identifiability reasons 
due to there being 20 data points).   
 
Table 3: Stimuli and associated statistics for Experiment 2 (corpus contains 9.1M 
words) 
Phrase 
 
 
Set 
 
 
Adjective  
information  
content (bits) 
Phrase 
frequency 
 
Adjective 
frequency 
 
Noun 
frequency 
 
Frequency of 
first (and 
second) 
syllable 
messy hair 1 9.39 7 457 4686 6077(15096) 
curly hair 2 7.24 31 158 4686 600(87552) 
big hat 1 6.6 40 18106 3887 18106 
magic hat 2 10.92 2 544 3887 5726(270) 
straight line 1 4.06 52 964 868 970 
long line 2 5.24 23 3996 868 5462 
young man 1 5.86 86 379 5000 459 
mean man 2 11.29 2 5538 5000 5595 
runny nose 1 5.81 72 112 4052 2551(38395) 
round nose 2 9.4 6 5456 4052 9989 
funny pajamas 1 9.64 1 4519 797 4962 (38395) 
cuddly pajamas 2 8.05 3 66 797 66 (87552) 
bumpy road 1 5.29 31 169 1217 536 (8898) 
tiny road 2 8.66 3 1040 1217 6913 (38395) 
dirty shoes 1 9.23 5 2330 2993 2332(26044) 
new shoes 2 5.26 78 3699 2993 3908 
huge tower 1 10.16 1 276 1147 277  
tall tower 2 4.58 48 773 1147 774 
old woman 1 3.46 29 2739 320 2797 
kind woman 2 8.32 1 3583 320 3603 
  
 To check whether the picture stimuli would elicit mention of the features even 
in the absence of having heard an adjective, a separate group of 24 children (mean age 
55 months; Range: 48 ± 65 months) were presented with the stimuli pictures 
following the same procedure as in study 2. Each participant saw a randomly selected 
set of stimuli, with each noun occurring only once, appearing in a random order. For 
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every other item the adjective was replaced with a cough such that it sounded as if the 
experimenter had intended to produce an adjective but it was unclear what this was. In 
this way, children were primed to produce adjective-noun combinations but on cough 
+ noun trials the only thing that could have influenced adjective production was the 
LPDJHQRWWKHH[SHULPHQWHU¶VFKRLFHRIPodification). When children came to 
describe pictures following cough + noun trials, they were equally likely to produce a 
noun as on adjective + noun trials. However, they were less likely to produce an 
adjective  (Adjective + noun stimuli: 72% child adjective provision. Cough + noun 
stimuli: 14% adjective provision) and less likely to reference the same feature as the 
experimenter (Adjective + noun stimuli: 68% same feature. Cough + noun stimuli: 
10% same feature). Thus children were very unlikely to happen upon mentioning the 
VDPHIHDWXUHDVWKHH[SHULPHQWHULIWKH\KDGQ¶WDOUHDG\KHDUGDQDGMHFWLYH:KHQWKH\
did so this was not correlated with the adjective information content of the adjective 
that had been replaced by the cough. This suggests that chilGUHQ¶VDGMHFWLYHSURYLVLRQ 
in the main experiments was driven by the descriptions they had heard the 
experimenter produce.   
 Procedure. The procedure was the same as in the picture-visible-to-addressee 
condition from Experiment 1, with the exception that rather than E1 holding up and 
describing pictures in the first stage, a slide show on a computer screen was employed 
to play the recorded descriptions using a media enhanced pdf presentation.   
 Coding. &KLOGUHQ¶VUHVSRQVHVZHUH coded (using the same criteria as for 
Experiment 1) by a research assistant blind to the purpose of the study. Responses 
from 11 children were reliability coded by a second research assistant (also blind to 
the hypotheses) who agreed with the first coder on 95% of responses for the first 
coding decision (i.e., whether an adjective was produced, ț = 0.905) and 89% of 
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responses for the second coding decision (i.e., whether it was the same adjective as 
the experimenter, ț = 0.765). 
 
Results 
 Of the 119 responses children made in total, 21% of these contained no 
adjective, 55% contained the same adjective as the experimenter had used, and 24% 
contained a different adjective. For the 29 responses in which a different adjective 
was used, 14 unambiguously referred to the same semantic feature as the 
H[SHULPHQWHU¶VDGMHFWLYH.  
 The same analyses were performed as for Experiment 1, using the same 
models, including the same random effects. Bayes factors are a particularly 
appropriate statistic for evaluating replication as they allow us to assess the evidence 
in favour of the null hypothesis as well as the hypothesis (Dienes, 2016). As the priors 
used to calculate these need to be informative, we updated the priors for the slopes to 
include the new evidence from experiment one. Means of zero were retained but the 
standard deviations for the prior on these two decisions were set equal to the 
respective slopes estimated from the Experiment 1 data.  
The inferred parameters for the decisions of interest are shown in table 2. The 
model is visualized in figure 3. The lines represent the fitted models with intercepts 
adjusted to the participant harmonic mean where relevant random terms were included. 
Figure 3a plots the proportion of children who produced an adjective as a function of 
information. For those cases in which an adjective was produced, figure 3b shows 
ZKHWKHURUQRWLWZDVWKHVDPHDGMHFWLYHDVWKHH[SHULPHQWHU¶VThe likelihood of a child 
producing an adjective increases by 24% for each additional bit of information given by 
WKHH[SHULPHQWHU¶VDGMHFWLYHThe Bayes factor of 10.78 tells us there is positive 
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evidence that the probability of children producing an adjective increases with 
information content.  
While this experiment was powered to look for replication of the above effect 
of information content on adjective production, the model also tells us that the 
likelihood of a child who produces an adjective producing the same adjective as the 
experimenter, in contrast, decreases by 8% for each bit of information it provides. The 
Bayes factor of 0.82 tells us that the data is by itself is inconclusive as to whether 
adjectives that have lower information content are more likely to be directly 
reproduced than those who have higher information content (the data by itself 
provides no clear evidence for or against the proposal).  
 The above Bayes factor concerns whether the slope for the second decision 
differed from zero. As for Experiment 1, we also tested whether the slope for the 
second decision differed from the slope of the first decision. We built a model 
including a shared slope term and a same-adjective decision-specific term (with 
doubled standard deviation on the prior to allow the slopes to vary in direction). We 
observe a positive shared slope (mean estimate = .23, SD =.1 , p < .001) with a 
negative same-adjective decision specific term (mean estimate = -.31, SD = .18, p =  
.036, Bayes factor = 3.18). This is positive evidence that adjective information content 
has a different relationship to deciding whether to produce an adjective than it does to 
deciding whether to produce the same adjective as the experimenter.  
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Table 4.  
Summary of fixed effects for a) the proportion of participants who produced an adjective 
(adjective coded as 1, no adjective coded as 0); b) the proportion of the participants who 
produced the same adjective as the experimenter (for cases in which an adjective was 
produced; same adjective coded as 1, different adjective coded as 0) for Experiment 2.  
 Did the child use an adjective? Was it the same adjective as E1? 
 
 
      ȕ 
 
SD p Bayes 
Factor 
ȕ 
 
SD p Bayes 
Factor 
Intercept 0.78   
(-0.07-
1.70) 
0.55 .065  1.16 
(0.38-
1.99) 
0.50 .007  
Information 
content 
0.21 
(0.06-
0.37) 
0.09 .010 10.78 -.08      
(-0.30-
0.13) 
0.14 .266 0.82 
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a) 
 
b) 
 
Figure 3. The relation (in Experiment 2) between adjective informativeness and a) the 
proportion of participants who produced an adjective; b) the proportion of the 
participants who produced the same adjective as the experimenter (for cases in which 
an adjective was produced).  
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 Finally, we assessed whether when children were attempting to reference the 
same feature as the experimenter, they did so by using a less informative (more 
IUHTXHQWDGMHFWLYHJLYHQWKHQRXQ$FURVVWKHWZRH[SHULPHQWVFKLOGUHQ¶VDOWHUQDWLYH
adjectives had a mean information content of 7.05, compared to a mean information 
content of 8.52 for the H[SHULPHQWHU¶VDGMHFtives for the same items. We fitted a 
multilevel linear effects model with information content as the outcome and speaker 
(experimenter or child, coded as 0 and 1 respectively) as a predictor. Random effects 
of participant and target adjective on the intercept were included  (the random effects 
structure was chosen in the same manner as for the main experiments, except that we 
GLGQ¶WFRQVLGHUUDQGRPVORSHVGXHWRWKHVPDOOVDPSOH- only half of the phrases were 
subject to substitution and for half of these substitution happened only once). To 
allow estimation of a Bayes factor, an informative prior was used for the speaker 
parameter. We assumed that the change in information content between the 
H[SHULPHQWHU¶VDGMHFWLYHDQGWKHDGMHFWLve the child used was likely to be at most the 
range of the information content of the stimuli, and thus we assigned a normal 
distribution with a mean of zero and the standard deviation set to equal the range. The 
parameter for speaker (mean estimate = -1.46, SD = .48, p = .002, Bayes factor = 
9.42) supports the hypothesis that when children were attempting to reference the 
same feature as the experimenter but with other means, they opted to replace the 
unexpected adjective with more expected words. 
General Discussion 
In the current experiments, children heard someone give more or less 
informative descriptions of pictures. They then needed to describe these pictures to 
another person. As the information content of the adjectives in the initial descriptions 
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increased, so GLGFKLOGUHQ¶VWHQGHQF\WRWKHPVHOYHVuse an adjective. Thus 
information theory can explain what children choose to say. 
 0RVWUHVSRQVHVZLWKDQDGMHFWLYHGLUHFWO\UHXVHGWKHH[SHULPHQWHU¶VSKUDVH
While reuse may be a shortcut to production, there was evidence of a counter pressure 
to taking it. Whereas increasing information content made children more likely to 
produce an adjective, it bore a different relation to the tendency to produce the same 
adjective as the experimenter (which decreased in Experiment 1 and tended to do so 
in Experiment 2). We ascribe this to the difficulty children encounter in producing 
low frequency word combinations. When children chose alternative means of 
referencing the same feature as the experimenter, the adjectives they used were more 
frequent given the noun.  This trade-off has potential consequences for FKLOGUHQ¶V
developing grammatical productivity. If children strive to be informative, they will 
need to stray off well-known linguistic territory, pushing them to produce novel word 
combinations and yet this creativity is constrained by ease of production.  
 Were children striving to be informative for the benefit of their addressee? 
Children this age are certainly capable of audience design in some cases (e.g., Saylor 
et al., 2006). However, there was no evidence of adaptation to a specific listener in 
Experiment 1. We therefore assume that children were adapting to a generic listener 
LHZKDW2¶1HLOOUHIHUVWRDVFRJQLWLYH- rather than social or mindful - 
pragmatics). It will be important to determine what underpins this type of pragmatic 
skill, also observed in adult language production where, for example, rate of 
information flow is managed right from the phonological to the syntactic level (Aylett 
& Turk, 2004; Jaeger, 2010). While much research has explored social cognition as an 
explanatory factor in pragmatic competence, recent theoretical accounts suggest we 
have underestimated the role of other cognitive processes in supporting interaction 
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(Apperly, 2010). Work on individual differences could test the prediction that the 
ability to comment on the unexpected depends on cognitive capacities such as 
attending to similar features as others and learning about statistical regularities in the 
environment. To the extent that we track the same probabilities in the world, we find 
the same things noteworthy and are thus able to have mutually satisfying 
conversations.   
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